Abstract. Term-generic logic (TGL) is a first-order logic parameterized with terms defined axiomatically (rather than constructively), by requiring them to only provide generic notions of free variable and substitution satisfying reasonable properties. TGL has a complete Gentzen system generalizing that of first-order logic. A certain fragment of TGL, called Horn 2 , possesses a much simpler Gentzen system, similar to traditional typing derivation systems of λ-calculi. Horn 2 appears to be sufficient for defining a whole plethora of λ-calculi as theories inside the logic. Within intuitionistic TGL, a Horn 2 specification of a calculus is likely to be adequate by default. A bit of extra effort shows adequacy w.r.t. classic TGL as well, endowing the calculus with a complete loose semantics.
Introduction
First-order logic (FOL) does not allow variables to be bound in terms (but only in formulae, via quantifiers), thus providing a straightforward notion of substitution in terms. On the other hand, most calculi that are used in the domain of programming languages, and not only, are crucially based on the notion of binding of variables in terms: terms "export" only a subset of their variables, the free ones, that can be substituted. Because of their complex formulation for terms, these calculi cannot be naturally defined as FOL theories. Consequently, they need to define their own models and deduction rules, and to state their own theorems of completeness, not always easy to prove. In other words, they are presented as entirely new logics, as opposed to theories in an existing logic, thus incurring all the drawbacks (and boredom) of repeating definitions and proofs following generic, well-understood patterns, but facing new "details".
In this paper we define term-generic first-order logic, or simply term-generic logic (TGL), as a first-order logic parameterized by any terms that come with abstract notions of free variable and substitution. More precisely, in TGL terms are elements in a generic set Term (including a subset Var whose elements are called variables) that comes with functions FV : Term → P f (Var ) and Subst : Term × Term Var → Term for free variables and substitution, respectively, satisfying some expected properties. TGL models provide interpretations of terms that satisfy, again, some reasonable properties. We show that TGL admits a complete Gentzen-like deduction system, which is syntactically very similar to that of FOL; its proof of completeness modifies the classic proof of completeness for FOL to use the generic notions of term, free variables and substitution.
Because of not committing to any particular definition of term, TGL can be instantiated to different types of terms, such as standard FOL terms or different categories of (typed or untyped) λ-terms. When instantiated to standard FOL terms, TGL becomes, as expected, precisely FOL. However, when instantiated to more complex terms, e.g., the terms of λ-calculus, TGL becomes a logic where a particular calculus is a particular theory. For example, the TGL axiom for typing abstractions in simply-typed λ-calculus can be (∀x. x : t ⇒ X : t ) ⇒ (λx : t.X) : t → t where x and t, t denote data and type variables, respectively, X denotes an arbitrary data term, ⇒ is the logical implication, and → is the arrow type construct (binary operator on types). The above is an axiom-scheme, parameterized by any choice of variables x, t, t and term X (and, as customary, each of its instances is implicitly assumed universally quantified over all its free variables). The colons in x : t and X : t and the outermost colon in (λx : t. X) : t → t refer to a binary relation symbol in TGL, while the colon in λx : t.X is part of the term syntax. The term X may contain the free variable x, which is bound by ∀ in the lefthand side of the outermost implication, and by λ in the righthand side. Both these capturings of x from X are intended -in fact, the migration of x between the two scopes is at the heart of the intended typing mechanism: x is an actual, but arbitrary input to the function described by X in the former case, and a formal parameter in the latter; the type t → t is assigned to the abstraction λx : t.X by "experimenting" with arbitrary x's of type t and "observing" if the result has type t . (Using the same notation for actual as for formal parameters of functional expressions is well-established mathematical practice.)
A possible instance of the above axiom-scheme, taking, e.g., λy : t . y x as X and spelling out all the universal quantifications, is ∀t, t , t . (∀x. x : t ⇒ (λy : t . y x) : t ) ⇒ (λx : t. λy : t . y x) : t → t , which implies in TGL, instantiating t with t → t and t with (t → t ) → t , ∀t, t . (∀x. x : t ⇒ (λy : t → t . y x) : (t → t ) → t ) ⇒ (λx : t. λy : t → t . y x) : t → (t → t ) → t . Moreover, we can prove in TGL, using again the above axiom-scheme and another axiom for application, that the hypothesis (i.e., the lefthand side of the outermost ⇒) in the latter sentence is true for all t , t , hence we obtain a TGL derivation of ∀t, t . (λx : t. λy :
A specification of a calculus in TGL brings a meaningful complete semantics for that calculus, because the axioms are stated about some models, the content of the axioms making the models "desirable". Indeed, TGL models are initially "blank", in that they are only required to interpret the terms consistently with substitution -it is the axioms that customize the models. For instance, the previously discussed description of x as an "actual, but arbitrary parameter" is not merely an informal idea to help the intuition, but a mathematical fact within the TGL semantics: when "escaped" from the scope of λ into the scope of ∀, x indeed denotes an actual, but arbitrary inhabitant of a desirable model.
Even though the completeness (being equivalent to semi-decidability) of a fragment of a logic (whose syntax is decidable) follows from the completeness of the richer logic, there are good reasons to develop complete proof systems for certain particular sublogics as well. Besides a better understanding and selfcontainment of the sublogic, one important reason is the granularity of proofs. Indeed, proofs of goals in the sublogic that use the proof-system of the larger logic may be rather long and "junkish" and may look artificial in the context of the sublogic. For example, equational logic admits a very intuitive complete proof system [5] , that simply "replaces equals by equals", thus avoiding the more intricate first-order proofs. An important goal of this paper is to also investigate conditions under which sublogics of TGL admit specialized coarse-granularity proof systems.
It appears that a certain fragment of TGL, that we call Horn 2 , is sufficient for calculi-specification purposes. Horn 2 consists of TGL sentences of the form
) ⇒ c(y) with a i , b i , c atomic formulae (x and y denote tuples of variables), i.e., generalized Horn implications whose conditions are themselves (single-hypothesis) 1 Horn implications. We show that, under a reasonable restriction that we call amenability, a Horn 2 theory admits a complete Gentzen system that "implements" each Horn 2 formula as above into a deduction rule of the form Γ, a i (z, T ) b i (z, T ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} Γ c(T ) where T is a tuple of terms substituting y and z is a fresh tuple of variables substituting x. The (multiple-formulae antecedent, single-formula succedent) structure of this system follows the style of intuitionistic logic, and indeed we show that it specializes the Gentzen system of the intuitionistic version of TGL. Thus we obtain for the Horn 2 fragment an intuitionistic proof system which is complete w.r.t. classical models! Moreover, this "lower-level" Gentzen system, extracted from the higher-level notation used in the Horn 2 theory, recovers the original calculus itself (bringing what in syntactic encoding frameworks is usually referred to as adequacy of the representation). For instance, the Horn 2 deduction rule corresponding to the aforementioned typing axiom for typed λ-calculus is precisely the familiar context-based typing rule for abstractions:
By substitution, x from the typing axiom became a fresh z in the deductive system, the variables t, t became arbitrary terms T, T , and X became a term Z such that the positions in which x occurred in X are the same as the positions in which z now occurs in Z (because the term X and the positioning of x in X were arbitrary in the typing axiom, it follows that the term Z and the positioning of z in Z are also arbitrary in the resulted deduction rule). This transformation is prescribed uniformly, i.e., calculus-independently, for any Horn 2 theory. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces classic TGL (syntax, models, institutional structure, Gentzen system and completeness theorem) and intuitionistic TGL. Section 3 discusses the Horn 2 fragment and its specialized Gentzen systems, whose completeness "prepares" the logic for future adequacy results. Section 4 illustrates the TGL adequate by default specification style for λ-calculi, taking System F as a working example. Section 5 discusses related work and draws conclusions. More details regarding the topics addressed in this paper, including proofs of the stated facts, can be found in the technical report [23] -the main part of the report has the same content as this paper, while the appendix of the report contains further details and proofs.
Term-Generic First-Order Logic
We introduce a generic notion of first-order term, axiomatized by means of free variables and substitution, purposely not committing to any concrete syntax for terms. Then we show our first novel result in this paper, namely a development of first-order logic that does not depend on the syntax of terms, but only on the properties of substitution. We first develop the logic in an unsorted form and without equality, and later sketch equality and order-sorted extensions, as well as an intuitionistic variant. These are subject to the following requirements (where x ranges over variables, T, T over terms, and θ, θ over maps in Term Var ):
Note that we assume the notion of term coming together with a notion of substitution which is composable (condition (4) above). In general, for a syntax with bindings, composability of substitution does not hold for raw terms, but only for α-equivalence classes -therefore, in the concrete instances of our logic to calculi with bindings, TGL terms will be α-equivalence classes of what are usually called (raw) "terms" in these calculi. Conditions (1)-(6) from Definition 1 are natural (and well-known) properties of substitution holding for virtually all notions of terms with static binding (modulo α-equivalence).
For distinct variables x 1 , . . . , x n , we write [T 1 /x 1 , . . . , T n /x n ] for the function Var → Term that maps x i to T i for i = 1, n and all the other variables to themselves, and
Definition 2.A term-generic language consists of a term syntax (Term,FV,Subst) over a set Var and an at most countable ranked set Π = (Π n ) n∈I N , of relation symbols. A TGL model for a language as above is a triple of the form
Thus, unlike in classic FOL models where the interpretation of terms is built from operations, in TGL models the interpretation of terms is assumed (in the style of Henkin models). It turns out that condition (b.ii) is redundant (follows from the other conditions and Definition 1 -see Section F.1 in [23] for a proof) In what follows, we let x, x i , y, u, v, etc., range over variables, T, T i , T , etc., over terms, θ, θ , etc., over maps in Term
Var , ρ, ρ , etc., over valuations in A Var , and π, π , etc., over relation symbols. Sometimes we simply write Term for term syntaxes (Term, FV , Subst) and (Term, Π) for term-generic languages.
Formulae are defined as usual, starting from atomic formulae π(T 1 , . . . , T n ) and applying connectives ∧, ⇒ and quantifier ∀. (Other connectives and quantifiers may of course be also considered, but we omit them since they shall not be needed for our specifications in this paper.) For each formula ϕ, the set A ϕ ⊆ A Var , of valuations that make ϕ true in A, is defined recursively on the structure of formulae as follows:
Var we say that A satisfies ϕ and write A |= ϕ. Given a set of formulae Γ , A |= Γ means A |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ . Above, and from now on, we let ϕ, ψ, χ range over formulae and A, B over models (sometimes, when we want to distinguish models from their carrier set A, B, we write A, B for the models). For formulae, the notions of free variables, α-equivalence, and substitution are the natural ones, defined similarly to the case of FOL, but on top of our generic terms rather than FOL terms. For substitution in formulae we adopt notational conventions similar to the ones about substitution in terms, e.g., ϕ[T /x]. Note that TGL is a logic generic only w.r.t. terms -formulae are "concrete" first-order formulae built over generic terms, with a "concrete" (and not generic) notion of α-equivalence, standardly defined using the bindings from quantifiers, which preserves satisfaction and the free variables and is compatible with substitution and the language constructs. Hereafter we identify formulae modulo α-equivalence. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a tuple of variables and J = {y 1 , . . . , y m } a set of variables. Then Vars(x) denotes the set {x 1 , . . . , x n }, ∀x. ϕ denotes ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n .ϕ, and ∀J. ϕ denotes ∀y 1 . . . ∀y m .ϕ (the latter notation making an (immaterial for our purposes) choice of a total ordering on J). A sentence is a formula with no free variables. The universal closure of a formula ϕ is the sentence ∀FV (ϕ). ϕ. (See Section A.1 in [23] for more details.)
The inclusion of an emphasized equality symbol in our logic, interpreted in all models as equality, yields TGL with equality. Many-sorted and order-sorted variants of TGL (in the style of [13] ) can also be straightforwardly obtained, by extending Definition 1 to term syntaxes involving multiple sorts (syntactic categories) and Definition 2 to models having as carriers sort-indexed sets. For example, in the case of order-sorted TGL, a poset (S, <) of sorts is fixed and carriers of models are families of sets (A s ) s∈S such that s < s implies A s ⊆ A s for all s, s ∈ S. (See Sections A.2 and A.3 in [23] for details.) All the concepts and results about TGL in this paper, including completeness of various proof systems for various fragments of the logic, can be easily (but admittedly tediously) extended to the many-sorted and order-sorted cases. ,π) ) n∈I N ,π∈Πn ) by defining the meaning of terms as derived operations. Conversely, a TGL model (A, (A T ) T ∈Term , (A (n,π) ) n∈I N ,π∈Πn ) yields an FOL model by defining A σ : A n → A as A σ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = A σ(x1,...,xn) (ρ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct variables and ρ is a valuation that maps each x i to a i . The two model mappings are mutually inverse and preserve satisfaction. Thus, for this particular choice of terms, TGL yields FOL.
A Formula-Typed Logic (an "Extremely-Typed" λ-Calculus). FOL is a simple instance of TGL. However, TGL terms may be arbitrarily exotic. Besides terms of λ-calculi (discussed in Section 4), one may also have terms that interfere with formulae in non-trivial ways, where, e.g., terms may abstract variables having formulae as types (thinking of types as sets defined by comprehension). Let (Var , Σ, Π) be a classic first-order language and:
with the natural restrictions w.r.t. the rank of operations/relations. Free variables and substitution are as expected, making terms up to α-equivalence a TGL term syntax. Moreover, although formulae and terms were defined mutually recursively, the former are still nothing but first-order formulae over terms, hence fall under TGL. Does the interpretation of formulae inside terms match their first-order interpretation at the top level? The answer is "no, unless axioms require it" (remember that TGL models are blank, but customizable). Here, postulating (∀x. (ϕ ⇔ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ⇒ T = T )) ⇒ λx : ϕ.T = λx : ψ.T does the job.
The TGL institution. Next we submit TGL to a standard well-behaving test for a logical system, organizing it as an institution [12] . By doing so, we present TGL terms and models in a more structural light, and, more importantly, create a framework for λ-calculi with different flavors to cohabitate with each other and with classic FOL under different signatures and axioms, but within the same logic, connected through the railway system of signature morphisms.
Let 
, for all terms T .) To any signature morphism (u, v), we associate: -A translation map between the sentences of (Term, Π) and (Term , Π ), that replaces the terms and relation symbols with their images through u and v.
-The following reduct functor between the categories of models of (Term , Π ) 
On morphisms, it maps a function representing a model homomorphism to the same function regarded as an homomorphism between the reduct models. (Details and pictures in [23] , Sec. A.4.) Theorem 1. TGL as organized above forms an institution that extends conservatively the institution of FOL. TGL Gentzen System and Completeness. The axiomatic properties of the generic notions of free variable and substitution in TGL provide enough infrastructure to obtain generic versions of classic FOL results. We are interested in a completeness theorem here (but other model-theoretic results could be also generalized). We shall use a generalization of the cut-free system in [10] .
We fix a term-generic language (Term, Π). A sequent is a pair written Γ ∆, with antecedent Γ and succedent ∆ (at most) countable sets of formulae, assumed to have finite support, in that FV (Γ ) and FV (∆) are finite, where FV (Γ ) = ϕ∈Γ FV (ϕ) (and likewise for ∆). (In standard Gentzen systems for FOL, Γ and ∆ are typically assumed finite, which of course implies finite support.) The sequent Γ ∆ is called tautological, written |= Γ ∆, if ϕ∈Γ A ϕ ⊆ ψ∈∆ A ψ for all models A; it is called E-tautological (where E is a set of sentences), written E |= (Γ ∆), if A |= E implies ϕ∈Γ A ϕ ⊆ ψ∈∆ A ψ for all models A. If Γ = ∅, we write E |= ∆ instead of E |= (Γ ∆).
We consider the Gentzen system, say G, given by the rule schemes in Figure  1 , meant to deduce TGL tautological sequents (we write Γ, ϕ instead of Γ ∪{ϕ}). Note that these rules make sense in our generic framework, since concrete syntax of terms is not required; all that is needed here are abstract notions of term and substitution. We write G Γ ∆ to mean that Γ ∆ is deducible in G. Similar notation will be used for the other proof systems hereafter. Theorem 2. G is sound and complete for TGL. Intuitionistic Term-Generic Logic (ITGL). It has the same syntax as TGL, and its Gentzen system GI is obtained by modifying G so that the succedents in sequents are no longer sets of formulae, but single formulae, as follows: (1) ∆ is deleted from all the Right rules and is replaced by a single formula χ in (Ax) and in all the Left rules except for (Left⇒). (2) The rule (Left⇒) is replaced by Γ ϕ Γ, ψ χ Γ, ϕ ⇒ ψ χ (Section A.5 in [23] gives more details.)
The Horn 2 Fragment of Term-Generic Logic
We next consider a fragment of TGL, called Horn 2 because it only allows formulae which are universally quantified implications whose conditions are themselves universally quantified implications of atomic formulae. A whole plethora of λ-calculi can be specified by Horn 2 formulae (see Section 4 and [23], Section C). As shown in the sequel, we can associate uniformly to these specifications complete intuitionistic proof systems that turn out to coincide with the originals.
In what follows, x denotes variable tuples (x 1 , . . . , x n ), T term tuples (T 1 , . . . , T n ), and, for a formula ϕ, ϕ(x) indicates that ϕ has all its free variables among {x 1 , . . . , x n }, with ϕ(T ) then denoting ϕ[T 1 /x 1 , . . . , T n /x n ]. Since variables are particular terms, given y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ), we may use the notation ϕ(y) with two different meanings, with disambiguation coming from the context: either to indicate that ϕ has its variables among {y 1 , . . . , y n }, case in which ϕ(y) is the same as ϕ, or to denote the formula obtained from ϕ(x) by substituting the variables x with y. (Thus, e.g., in the property ( * ) below, a i (x, y) is the same as a i , where in addition we have indicated that the free variables of a i are among Vars(x, y) (where (x, y) is the concatenation of the tuples x and y). Later, given the tuples z and T of appropriate lengths, a i (z, T ) denotes the formula obtained from a i by substituting the variables of x correspondingly with those of z and the variables of y correspondingly with the terms of T .) For convenience, we assume the logic also contains (meaning "true") as an atomic formula.
Let Horn 2 be the TGL fragment given by the sentences:
where a i , b i , c are atomic formulae and we assume Vars(x)∩Vars(y) = ∅. We call these Horn 2 sentences (sometimes we shall refer to them as Horn 2 formulae, not forgetting though that they have no free variables). When one of the above a i 's is we write only b i (x, y) instead of a i (x, y) ⇒ b i (x, y), and when all the a i 's are we call the sentence ( * ) extensional [25] ; if, in addition, x has length 0, we obtain a Horn sentence (that is, a universal closure of a Horn formula). When all b i 's are or n = 0, the whole sentence ( * ) becomes ∀y. c(y). A theory E is called Horn 2 , extensional, or Horn if it consists of such sentences. Fix a term-generic language and a Horn 2 theory (i.e., specification) E over this language. In what follows, we focus on Horn sequents, i.e., sequents Γ d with Γ finite set of atomic formulae and d atomic formula, which can be deduced from E. Only Horn consequences are usually relevant for λ-calculi, and, moreover, the other more syntactically complicated consequences can be deduced from these. We let K E denote the following Gentzen system for Horn sequents:
In the rule (Inst-e) above (the "instance of e" rule), e is a sentence in E of the form ( * ) (thus a i , b i , c are the atomic formulae that build e), T is a tuple of terms with the same length as y, and z is a fresh tuple of variables with the same length as x (where "fresh" (without further attributes) means, as usual, "fresh for everything in that context", namely: for Γ , the a i 's, the b i 's, c and T ). Thus (Inst-e) is a rule (more precisely, a rule-scheme) parameterized not only by e, but also by z and T as above (and by Γ , too). (More details in [23] , Sec. B.) A first result is that K E deduces all intuitionistic Horn consequences of E:
Now consider the following family of rules (Drop) = (Drop-(e, a) ) e,a , parameterized by formulae e ∈ E of the form ( * ) and by atomic formulae a such that a is one of the a i 's (for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}):
(T is a tuple of terms of the same length as y and z a tuple of variables of the same length as x fresh for d (where y and x are the ones referred in ( * )).) From the point of view of forward proofs, (Drop) effectively drops a(z, T ). More interesting than the actual usage of (Drop) is its admissibility in a system. In a specification of a type system for a λ-calculus, a(z, T ) will typically have the form z : T , and closure of the system under a(z, T ) will be a condensing lemma [3] : the assumption z : T is useless provided z is not in the succedent.
Next are our main results of this section, exploring closure under (Drop). The first gives a sufficient criterion ensuring completeness of K E w.r.t. TGL models. The second gives a stronger fully syntactic criterion. Theorem 4. Assume that: -(i) If a i is not , then Vars(x) ∩ FV(a i ) = ∅, for all formulae e ∈ E of the form ( * ) and all i ∈ 1, n.
Theorem 5. Assume that all e in E of the form ( * ) satisfy the following for all i ∈ 1, n:
Then (Drop) is admissible in K E , hence the conclusion of Theorem 4 holds. If E is a Horn theory, Theorems 4, 5 yield the completeness result for a wellknown Hilbert system of Horn logic. More generally, amenability, hence completeness, holds trivially for extensional theories, since they have no (Drop) rules.
Thus classic TGL has, with respect to amenable theories and Horn consequences, the same deductive power as intuitionistic TGL. This fact will prove useful for adequacy results and completeness of the TGL models for various calculi. Because these calculi are traditionally specified following an intuitionistic pattern, an amenable Horn 2 specification E of a calculus will recover, in the system K E , the represented calculus itself -we discuss this phenomenon next.
Specifying calculi in Term-Generic Logic
Next, we consider the following standard Hilbert system for reduction in System F [11, 24] (obtained from the one for the untyped λ-calculus [4] by ignoring the type annotations), denoted RSF:
Our Horn 2 specification, denoted RSF, uses relation of arity data × data.
Particularly interesting are our axioms for β-reduction. In (β), we employ the same variable x to indicate both the formal parameter of the functional expression λx : t. Y and its actual parameter (the occurrence of x on the right of the application from the left side of ). Indeed, in the latter case, as well as in any presumptive occurrences in the rightmost Y , x is exposed to the environment, hence denotes an (arbitrary) actual value in a model. Again, K RSF is the same as RSF (modulo a standard identification of Hilbert systems with simple Gentzen systems where antecedents remain unchanged). Moreover, RSF is an extensional theory, hence trivially amenable, hence both intuitionistically and classically adequate: Proposition 3. Let X and Y be data terms. Then the following are equivalent:
One can readily see that, since the relation symbols of ST F and RSF are distinct, putting these theories together preserves adequacy -in other words, Propositions 1 and 2 remain true after replacing SFT with SFT ∪ RSF and Proposition 3 remains true after replacing RSF with SF T ∪ RSF. In the union language, we can express relevant properties such as type preservation: ∀x, y, t. x : t ∧ x y ⇒ y : t. The proof of such properties requires reasoning about the calculus, hence transcends the realm of adequate representations. To handle them, TGL needs to be extended with inductive proof schemes, such as:
The problem of meta-reasoning in a framework where object-level calculi are represented without explicitly encoding free variables and substitution (currently still open in frameworks such as HOAS) is not addressed in this paper, but is left as important future work. Intuitionistic TGL adequacy (Proposition 1) holds immediately (for the same reason as for System F) for all calculi specified in [23] , Section C. Classic TGL adequacy, on the other hand, while trivial for System F (in the context of our a priori proof theory), is not so in other calculi, where strong syntax-amenability does not hold, but only syntax amenability does, and closure under (Drop), while intuitive, is not obvious to prove. Fortunately however, for most of these calculi this property coincides with a known result called the condensing lemma (see [3] ): in a typing context Γ U : V , an assumption x : T from Γ with x fresh for U and V may be dropped without losing provability. Note that, via the propositions-as-types correspondence, representing adequately type systems in TGL also implies representing adequately proof systems for structural logics.
Sometimes a calculus does not come with a reduction relation, but with an equational theory. (Notably, a standard formulation of untyped λ-calculus [4] is equational.) For these situations, a version of TGL with equality seems a more elegant choice, but adequacy proofs along our lines seem to require more effort, since the TGL equality axioms raise problems regarding amenability (not to mention that type preservation needs to be proved beforehand for the calculus). Alternatively, one may provide semantic proofs for adequacy, taking advantage of the equivalence between the TGL models and some ad hoc models for which the calculus is known to be complete (see Section E in [23] for this approach).
Concluding Remarks
Summing up the contribution of this paper: (1) We showed that the development of first-order logic is largely orthogonal to the particular syntax of terms by defining a logic, TGL, that considers terms as "black-boxes" exporting substitution and free variables and requires models to represent terms consistently. TGL forms an institution, hence allows in principle for well-structured logical specifications. (2) TGL provides a convenient notation and intuition for defining λ-calculi, that encourages a semantic specification style. We developed some proof theory to support this specification style. Intuitionistic TGL allows immediately adequate specifications, while for classic TGL adequacy, if provable, endows the specified calculus with a default complete semantics.
The idea of developing first-order logic on top of an abstract term syntax, as well as our proof-theoretic results that prepare the logic in advance for adequate representations of λ-calculi, seem new. 4 We separate the discussion of related work into two (non-disjoint) topics.
One concerns semantics. The semantics that TGL offers to the specified calculi for free falls into the category of loose, or logical semantics. Examples of loose semantics for λ-calculi include: (so called) "syntactic" models for untyped λ-calculus, Henkin models for simply-typed λ-calculus, Kripke-style models for recursive types, and Girard's qualitative domains and Bruce-Meyer-Mitchell models for System F, not to mention all their categorical variants. The monographs [4, 14, 20] contain extensive presentations of these and many other loose semantics for various calculi. For a particular calculus defined as a TGL theory, the attached TGL semantics has all the advantages, but, naturally, also all the drawbacks, of loose semantics. It was not the concern of this paper to advocate for a loose or for a fixed-model semantics, especially because we believe that there is no absolute answer. What we consider to be a particularly appealing aspect of TGL semantics though is its uniform, calculus-independent nature. (We argue in [23] (Section E), with untyped λ-calculus and System F as witnesses, that the "general-purpose" TGL semantics of a calculus tends to be equivalent to the set-theoretic "domain-specific" one whose completeness theorem is typically worked out separately with substantial mathematical effort in the literature.)
The other topic concerns existing specification frameworks in the literature:
-Purely first-order encodings, such as combinatory logic [4] , de Bruijn-style representations [6] , and the calculus with explicit substitution [1] . Part of the motivation of TGL was to avoid the degree of awkwardness and auxiliary proof or execution overhead of such encodings.
-Higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS) [21, 15, 17] . This approach encodes (in a binding-preserving fashion) object-level terms into terms of a fixed meta logic (usually HOL or another type theory) -consequently, the interpretation of the object syntax into presumptive models of the meta logic would be indirect, filtered through the encoding. To the contrary, TGL is a parameterized logic, and gets instantiated to various calculi by importing the original term syntax as is and relating models to this syntax directly through valuations. Moreover, usually model-theoretic considerations are not the concern of HOAS, which aims at proof-theoretic adequacy alone, a property that so far seemed to require an intuitionistic meta logic; here we also developed for TGL a technique for establishing adequacy within a classic logic.
Yet, TGL representations have important similarities with HOAS encodings in variants of HOL (in the style of, e.g., [17] ). For instance, our axiom-scheme (Abs) from the Horn 2 theory T SF may be in such an encoding ∀X. (∀x. x : t ⇒ X(x) : t ) ⇒ Lam(X) : (t → t ), where X : data −→ data is a secondorder variable and Lam : (data −→ data) −→ data is a third-order constant. A HOAS encoding has typically two parts, each requiring its own adequacy result: one deals with representing the syntax of terms, and one with representing the deductive mechanism. Because TGL does not provide a representation of syntax (but assumes one already), some of our axioms, namely those changing variable scopes, such as (Abs), are (still) axiom-schemes, just like the rules of the original calculus are rule-schemes; to the contrary, the above HOAS axiom would be a single statement. On the other hand, for the same reason (of not dealing with term syntax representation), we were able to discuss the second part, of representing the deductive mechanism, generically, for any term syntax, and have created a theoretical framework where adequacy for the deductive mechanisms requires minimal proof effort. "Pasting" various solutions offered by HOAS to representing terms into the TGL framework for representing deduction could allow a HOAS setting to benefit from our theorems in Section 3, as well as allow a HOAS representation of an effective-syntax fragment of TGL to bypass the need of axiom-schemes in specifications.
Categorical models of syntax in the style of [9, 16] also fall within HOAS. Typing contexts are explicitly modeled as possible worlds, types becoming presheaves. The presheaf structure of λ-terms from [16] and the substitution algebras from [9] are roughly equivalent to our term syntaxes (whose presheaf structure would come, just like in the concrete cases, from classifying terms by their sets of free variables). The model theory of the these categorical settings follows a different approach than ours though -they require the models to support substitution within themselves and between each other (hence to be inhabited by syntactic items such as (abstract) terms and variables), while we require the models to allow valuations from a fixed term model.
-Nominal logic (NL) [22] . It stands somewhere in between purely first-order encodings and HOAS, as it captures object-level bindings, but not substitution, by corresponding meta-level mechanisms. The NL terms with bindings form term syntaxes in our sense. Like in the categorical approaches mentioned above and unlike TGL models, NL models are inhabited by abstract syntactic objects (having, e.g., free names that can be swapped/permuted) rather than constituting "pure" FOL-like semantics.
-Explicitly closed families of functionals (ECFFs) [2] (a.k.a. binding algebras [27] ). In the tradition of HOL a la Church, all bindings are reduced there to functional abstraction. Their terms form term syntaxes in our sense, and ECFFs are particular cases of TGL models.
-Binding logic (BL) [8] . It is a first-order logic defined on top of a general notion of syntax with binding, allowing bindings in both operations and atomic predicates. BL models reflect the bindings functionally (similarly to [2] , [27] ). While BL terms form TGL term syntaxes, it appears that the class of BL models is strictly embedded in that of TGL models for TGL terms syntax instantiated to a BL language of terms.
-Hereditary Harrop Formulae (HHF). For the FOL and HOL instances of TGL, Horn 2 formulae are particular cases of such formulae, advocated in [19] for logic programming. Our proof-theoretic results from Section 3 seem Horn 2 -specific, a generalization to HHF not being apparent.
-In the general realm of logical and algebraic specifications, a salient framework is that of institutions [12, 7] . Like TGL, the notion of institution does not represent logical systems by encoding them, but by becoming instantiated to them. Since we showed that TGL is itself an institution, 5 our work in this paper offers to the λ-calculi adequately specifiable in TGL institutional citizenship, hence the algebraic arsenal of tools and techniques from institution theory [26] .
